Abstract: Coordination problem among agents is very interesting area for studying. In this paper we will deal a problem how the agents can coordinate via coalition, we will also analyse a problem of choosing an optimal structure for agents' coalition. A method for reduction searching space for optimal coalition will be presented. Another problem is a coalition related a various parameters we will introduce and propose a method to resolve.
Introduction
In a practice, mainly in a market, is very often met a situation, where some subjects are coordinating to resolve one common problem or are joining one group, where each helps another with a purpose to improve overall profits of the whole group. Such problem, for example, was presented in works with a group of producers and goods by Frankovic and Dang (2001) or another authors. The focus of this paper is to propose a suitable method to search an optimal structure of these agents' groups. We will focus essentially to such agent's groups where each agent helps another and not tries to damage another's execution. Such agents' group is named a coalition Coalition formation among agents has been widely studied in some literatures as Kahan and Rapoport (1984) . The main solution concepts focus to negotiation process among self-interested agents on a basis of game theory. A process of formation agents' coalition has also been studied and discussed in several works presented by Sandholm and Tohmé (1999) . In these works the authors discussed about a problem of searching optimal agents' coalition. Searching process for optimal agents' coalition is based on heuristic approaches, and a motivation of each agent to join a coalition is to maximize monetary value, that each agent receives in coalition.
Similar to agents' coalition we can see in areas as parallel computing and distributed artificial intelligence, where to create an optimal structure of agents' coalition (for example: an optimal structure for coordinative workstations, processors… with a purpose to improve qualities of final results) may be applied a graph as in Rauber and Runger ( 1998) .
A lot of different applications were presented in various areas like economic, policy, or other also discussed about a problem of coalition but between human societies.
The agents that we consider to use in this paper may be autonomy, or coordinative agents, but all of them have interest to join coalition with another ones, however coalition may not bring all better results. Conflicts between agents in our model are omitted. These properties however are very often met in a practice, but to implement to our model it is necessary another as for example psychology knowledge.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 of paper will introduce the main problem of creating agents' coalition. In section 3 we will present an idea, which enables to reduce a searching process and can guarantee an optimal structure of agents' coalitions with an expected divergence. In another section we will deal a problem, where a target of each agent joint coalition is composed from various items. In a section 5 will shown a short illustrate example.
Coalition Structure of Agents
Let A={A 1 ,..,A n } be a set of n agents. We assume that, each agent has its plan, what it has to do and what will be a final result (it may be an expected profit, production time or another, and can be expressed by any function).
Let I={1,..,n} be a set of index of agents. We can define some basic definitions necessary for following using in this paper.
Definition1: Let A i , i∈I is an i-th agent of a set A, then 1. 
The first main subject of this paper is to find such structure of agents' coalitions to maximize a value F. to simplify this task we consider some following properties of our model, which eliminate complicated problems that we can meet in a practice inside coalition of human. 
Assumptions
then, a maximal value Q K of a set A K ={A i | i∈K} is defined as:
A property of a function Q K is presented in a following theory. 
A condition that a function Q is bounded can be easily proved by using assumption 1.
definition 2 is possible to write:
Theory is proved ‫ڤ‬
An important consequence deduced from this theory is: Q is equivalently to find max F. To find a maximal value of F, but it is necessary to search a whole space of M I . In a Sandholm, et al (1999) was shown that a volume of M I grows with exponential speed and ≅ ) ( n n O . Therefore, it is a very difficult task for a case with a lot of agents in a system, and at least to find a feasible solution is necessary to reduce a searching space by optimal manners. It is clear that a result obtained after reduction of searching space may be not the best of all, but we can predict a range where the result belongs. One of these methods will be presented in following section.
Approximate Coalition Structure by Merging Agents
Exist various methods for reduction of searching space. For example sequentially search in hierarchical levels with using or combination of various heuristicsearching methods, parallel searching methods with deduction interspaces, or another were presented as well in Bonacina (2000) . In this section is presented a method to reduce a searching space by merging agents. This method can be explained by following definition.
Definition 4:
An agent A i @ j is a merge of an agent A i and A j with following properties: By the words, both agents A i and A j are merged and presented by one new agent with all properties, as if both agents always join any common coalition.
By merge two agents, a number of agents after that is (n-1), and a searching space is reduced to
As mentioned above, an optimal result obtained after reduction may be not the best solution of all, but with a certain difference. For a quality of new optimal solution is valid a following theory.
Theory 2: Let denote: new F is a maximal overall value of a new set of agents after reduction,
Prof: Let a F have a maximal value in such structure of agents' coalitions:
where
max
By similar way is obtained:
The first case: if exists any K x , x∈[1,m] from (3) such that, both i,j ∈K x . From a definition 4 about merged agent, then, is deduced that must exist a K x n , x∈ [1,r] from (6), which involves both i and j. Because a new agent i@j has all properties as if both agents A i and A j are always in the same coalition.
The second case: if i∈K x , j∈K y ,
Similarly is obtained:
By substitute (9)+(10) to (8), after that (8) to (7) and by comparing with (4) the theory will be proved. ‫ڤ‬ Theory 2 is used to predict a difference between results obtained by approximation and the global optimal solution, which can be obtained by searching the whole space of all possible variants.
For users is the best if is happening the first case as introduced above after reduction by merging agents, therefore it is recommended to collect a pair of agents A i and A j , which have a maximal value max{ * @ j i q -* i q -* j q }, because for such pair is the highest probability to happen the first case after reduction.
Another property deduced from theory 2 is that, these values 1 ∆ and 2 ∆ are fully independent, thence each of them can be computed by every agent independently. A consequence from that is: before collecting pair agents to merge, every agent can compute and propose its value ∆ , on a basis of these values pair of two agents with the minimum ∆ will be collected.
Merging process may be continued father, but it means a difference between new results and the global optimal solution will increase. After each merge can be used theory 2 to predict an expected deviation.
Agents' Coalition with more parameters
In previous sections we have introduced a problem of searching an optimal structure of agents coalition to maximize an overall value of this set of agents. A value that each agent expects to improve when joins coalition is only a function of one parameter, in a practice is often met a situation where the agents are negotiating about a subject composed from various items, thence, the expected function when agent joins coalition with another ones is also composed from as many as these items. For example a case, which was studied in a paper of Frankovic and Dang (2001) , where a subject of negotiation is to improve a quality of production plan, and the goal of creating coalition is to increase profits, reduce production time, cost, or another. In such complicated case is suitable to apply fuzzy theory to improve a quality of the final solution and concurrently to reduce searching space.
Because of short framework of this paper the basic definitions of fuzzy theory are omitted. The readers can read in any literature about fuzzy theory.
It is assumed that each agent has its plan, what it has to do. An expected value of this plan is a function composed from a certain set of items. Instead of a value * i q we will use a function ) ,..., ( 1
where p is a number of items.
It is easy to verify that now a searching space grows
, therefore, to find the global optimal structure of agents' coalition with more than 15 agents, 5 items (n ≥ 15, p ≥ 5) is not effective.
It is assumed that, each agent can have a set plan that it is possible to apply by joining to coalition with another ones. Let denote S i as a set of possible plan for the agent A i , i∈I. We can prove that | S i | = 2 n-1 , where | S i | denotes a number of members of a set S i . Novak (1990) . 
4.
Step: From a set M search x, where x δ =max.
Then, a set of coalition that the agents choose in this case is the optimal.
For a set M is a valid following theory.
Theory 3: |M| is equal a searching space for I Q .
Prof: From step 3 is easy to see that every alternative, which is possible to examine in searching process I Q fulfils a condition 3. Another variant, which not belongs to searching space for I Q , for it, afterward, is not valid the condition 3.
In contrary way will be confrontation. ‫ڤ‬ From theory 3 it is possible to deduce that, a searching space by applying this approach can be reduced to ≅ ) (
if two first steps each agent can compute independently and parallel.
Step 3 is similar to a task introduced in a section 2. To resolve this step, thence, can apply a method presented in section 3 to reduce a complexity of the given problem.
Another related problems are methods for computing value i j β in step 2. Each agent can possesses different knowledge a can choose a different method, therefore, the final solution may be various, however with the same set of date.
Example
In this section we will show a short example to illustrate the previous presented theories.
Let be given two agents A1 and A2, each of them has its plan, but can join to coalition. The common coalition may improve some parameters of its plan, but in other hand may fail some another ones. By applying step 1 from section 4 will be obtained sets: 2 ) (
8/12 10/22 4/10 1 ∪ 2 4/12 12/22 6/10
In step 2: if both agents are pessimistic, results will be: β is applied an another method (a function sup() is changed to a function inf()), afterwards, the final solution shows that both agents will choose the second variant and will join coalition.
As shown above, a dimension of matrix ) ( 1 j q M and ) ( 2 j q M grows linearly with parameter p, hence, the method presented in section 4 can be applied for cases with bigger sum of parameters (p), but in a case, if a number of agents increases, dimension of these matrix will increase with exponential speed. Therefore, in a practice these methods can be applicable for cases with less than 15 agents.
6.Conclusion
In this paper we have presented one interesting problem that is often met in a practice, mainly in a market, or evently in human society. Coalition among agents is one of methods that enable the agents to coordinate. Coordination process among the agents can relate a lot of problems, as example: communication, negotiation between self-interest agents, and coordination in unknown environment connected with learning agents, or all another. All these features can be appeared and implemented in every coalition structure. In our model we have been while dealing a problem with simple agents, without unknown parameters and all agents are motivated to improve qualities of their execution, not only execution of every agent but also of another one, with a purpose to improve qualities of whole agents' society. It is a reason, for that we have introduced a criterion function F in a definition 1.
The contribution of this paper we can summarize briefly as following: We have presented a method for reduction a searching space, predicted difference of the optimal solution can be computed by theory in a section 3. Another problem, which has been presented and for it has been proposed a feasible solution, is a coalition with various parameters. Our method from section 4 shows that, complexity of searching space by applying this method can be reduced from ≅ . It is a sufficiently to enable to find the optimal solution. A short example to understand these previous theories has been shown in section 5. Various results can be appeared, dependently on knowledge of each agent.
A lot of problems, which while have not been introduced and resolved in this paper as: optimal method for creating fuzzy set ) ( 1 j q M and ) ( 2 j q M , problem with self-interest agents, negotiation between agents before choosing coalition also can reduce a searching space. About these problems we will discuss in future works.
